Cities, Preemption, and the Statutory Second
Amendment
Joseph Blocher†
Although the Second Amendment tends to dominate the discussion about legal
limits on gun regulation, nothing has done more to shape the state of urban gun law
than state preemption laws, which fully or partially limit cities’ ability to regulate
guns at the local level. The goals of this short Essay are to shed light on this
“Statutory Second Amendment” and to provide a basic framework for evaluating it.

INTRODUCTION
Most people in the United States live in urban areas, 1 and a
disproportionate number of gun homicide victims die in them 2 despite the fact that gun ownership is much less common in cities
than in rural areas. 3 The balance of gun rights and regulation is
thus an issue of particular concern for cities, and it is unsurprising that most gun regulation in the United States is, and has always been, done at the subfederal—and especially local—level. 4
And yet the past few decades have seen substantial convergence
between state and local gun rules. It is unlikely that the explanation for this convergence is purely “political,” because support for

† Lanty L. Smith ’67 Professor of Law, Duke Law School. Many thanks to Richard
Briffault, Jacob Charles, Aziz Huq, Darrell A.H. Miller, Richard Schragger, and Rachel
Simon for comments and to participants in this symposium and the State & Local Government
Works-in-Progress Conference at Willamette University College of Law.
1
Richard C. Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1163, 1166
(2018) (“[I]n 2010, 80.7% of the U.S. population was urban.”).
2
The victimization rates are disproportionate, even given population concentration.
See, e.g., Aliza Aufrichtig, Lois Beckett, Jan Diehm & Jamiles Lartey, Want to Fix Gun Violence in America? Go Local., THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 9, 2017), https://perma.cc/X52G-4K9A
(finding that half of all gun homicides in 2015 occurred in 125 cities that collectively accounted for less than a quarter of the country’s population); Richard Florida, The Geography
of Gun Violence in Cities and Metros, BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (Dec. 3, 2012),
https://perma.cc/ZEJ5-EA9N (finding that there were significantly higher rates of gunrelated homicides per 100,000 people in cities than in their respective metropolitan areas).
3
Ruth Igielnik, Rural and Urban Gun Owners Have Different Experiences, Views
on Gun Policy, PEW RSCH. CTR. (July 10, 2017), https://perma.cc/7DY8-TLEY.
4
See Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 YALE L.J. 82, 85, 108 (2013).
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gun regulation remains much higher in urban areas. 5 Cities seem
to be regulating guns less stringently than their residents would
like. Are there legal explanations for this gap?
The Second Amendment is the most common explanation, but
its impact in litigation has, in fact, been relatively muted, even after the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in District of Columbia v.
Heller 6 articulated an “individual” right to keep and bear arms
for certain private purposes. 7 That could change, of course, especially as the Supreme Court seems poised to reshape Second
Amendment doctrine in significant ways. 8 But for the moment,
the U.S. Constitution is not the insurmountable obstacle feared
by some advocates of regulation, nor is it the invincible champion
conjured by their opponents. 9
Yet guns do have significant statutory protections—laws that
limit the legal capacities of litigants and legislatures. 10 Some of
these laws immunize gun sellers and manufacturers from a wide
range of tort claims. 11 Others apply to the government itself—for
5
PEW RSCH. CTR., IN GUN DEBATE, SEVERAL OPTIONS DRAW MAJORITY SUPPORT 10
(2013), https://perma.cc/7KLN-CZ8N (finding that 60% of rural residents said it was more
important to protect gun rights than to control gun ownership, while only 37% said it was
more important to control ownership; for urban residents the figures were nearly the inverse: 37% prioritized gun rights, and 57% prioritized gun control); CNN & ORC, POLL:
MARCH 15 TO 17, 2013, at 41 (2013), https://perma.cc/3XLK-H666 (finding that 72% of rural residents believed that there should be either “no restrictions” or “minor restrictions”
on guns while only 46% of urban residents endorsed those positions).
6
554 U.S. 570 (2008).
7
Id. at 595.
8
See Adam Liptak, Justices’ Questions Suggest New York Gun Control Law Is Unlikely to Survive, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2021), https://perma.cc/V43G-QDRZ. The Court is
currently considering a case that is likely to extend the right to keep and bear arms outside
the home. See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Corlett, 141 S. Ct. 2566 (2021) (order
granting petition for writ of certiorari on the question of “[w]hether the State’s denial of
petitioners’ applications for concealed-carry licenses for self-defense violated the Second
Amendment”).
9
See JOSEPH BLOCHER & DARRELL A.H. MILLER, THE POSITIVE SECOND
AMENDMENT: RIGHTS, REGULATION, AND THE FUTURE OF HELLER 10 (2018) (arguing that
the Second Amendment can and does reasonably accommodate both rights and regulation).
10 For a deeper and more comprehensive overview of these laws, see Jacob D.
Charles, Securing Gun Rights by Statute: The Right to Keep and Bear Arms Outside the
Constitution, 120 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 8–36),
https://perma.cc/ST2J-7H83; David B. Kopel, The Right to Arms in the Living Constitution,
2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 99, 123–25 (noting that “the last several decades have
seen a litany of statewide legislation designed to protect the right to arms” and providing
examples).
11 See, e.g., Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, Pub. L. No. 109-92, 119 Stat.
2095 (2005) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901–7903, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922, 924 (2012)). When the
Act was signed into law, National Rifle Association leader Wayne LaPierre called it “the
most significant piece of pro-gun legislation in twenty years.” President Bush Signs
“Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act” Landmark NRA Victory Now Law, NRA
POL. VICTORY FUND (Oct. 26, 2005), https://perma.cc/PU4C-4URT.
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example, by limiting recordkeeping12 and funding for gun-related
research. 13
As a practical matter, though, nothing has done more to
shape contemporary gun regulation than state preemption laws,
which fully or partially eliminate cities’ ability to regulate guns
at the local level. 14 Although the claim is admittedly hard to
prove, it is likely that these preemption laws—nearly all of which
were adopted in the past forty years—have kept more gun regulations off the books in the past two decades than has the Second
Amendment in more than two centuries (including in the nearly
1,500 cases filed since Heller). 15 In effect, preemption laws restrict
gun laws in precisely the places—cities—where they are most viable 16 and provide broader protection for the right to keep and
bear arms than the Constitution has ever done.
The goals of this short Essay are to shed light on this “statutory Second Amendment” and to provide a basic framework for
evaluating it. The latter does not reduce to a simple argument for
or against preemption because different kinds of gun regulation
raise different issues regarding local variation. Uniform rules
may be necessary for disarming domestic abusers or imposing
manufacturing requirements—the costs and benefits of such laws
are unlikely to depend much on location, and their enforcement
must be done at a broad level in order to be effective. By contrast,
there are good reasons to think that restrictions on public
Other anti–gun control laws that apply to individuals include “take your gun to work”
laws, which effectively require businesses to permit guns onto their private property. For
an explanation of these laws and an argument that they implicate businesses’ own Second
Amendment rights, see Joseph Blocher, The Right Not to Keep or Bear Arms, 64 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 41–45 (2012).
12 The Tiahrt Amendments limit the ability of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives to require dealers to report their inventories. See Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, 123 Stat. 3034, 3128–29 (2009).
13 The Dickey Amendment provides that “none of the funds made available for injury
prevention and control at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention may be used to
advocate or promote gun control.” Department of Health and Human Services Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, 3244 (1996). In practice, it has meant
a near-total denial in federal funding for gun-violence-related research. See Jonathan M.
Metzl, The Dickey Amendment on Federal Funding for Research on Gun Violence: A Legal
Dissection, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 865, 866 (2018).
14 See Rachel Simon, The Firearm Preemption Phenomenon: Taking Aim at State
Restrictions on Local Gun Policy, 43 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at
33–43), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3623529.
15 See Eric Ruben & Joseph Blocher, From Theory to Doctrine: An Empirical Analysis
of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms After Heller, 67 DUKE L.J. 1433, 1471–86 (2018)
(providing an empirical overview of the constitutional doctrine and trends).
16 Monica Davey & Adeel Hassan, When Cities Try to Limit Guns, State Laws Bar
the Way, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2019), https://perma.cc/63DU-B3L4.

560

The University of Chicago Law Review

[89:2

carrying and high-powered weapons could vary between cities
and rural areas. As this Essay was being written, a gunman used
an assault weapon to kill ten people in a Boulder, Colorado, grocery store. Such weapons had been forbidden under a local ordinance until just ten days before the massacre, when the ordinance
was struck down on preemption grounds. 17 A few months later,
Colorado repealed its preemption law, suggesting that there is
still room for change. 18 And at oral argument in New York State
Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen19—the Second Amendment
case currently pending before the Supreme Court—many of the
Justices seemed sympathetic to the idea of local tailoring, even in
the context of a federal constitutional claim. Justice Clarence
Thomas asked, “Why can’t you have a . . . tailored approach for
[the] Second Amendment based upon if it’s density in New York
City, if that’s a problem, the subway, then you have a different
set of concerns in upstate New York?” 20 Justice Elena Kagan
called such an approach “completely intuitive.” 21
As with any nationwide narrative involving developments in
state law, there are important variations. But in this particular
case, and in keeping with this Symposium’s theme, Chicago can
serve as the story’s protagonist because gun violence is such a
visceral reality here and the city has faced significant practical,
constitutional, and statutory obstacles in trying to address it.
The opening sentence of a report by the Chicago Police Department puts the matter in stark terms: “Gun violence is Chicago’s most urgent problem.” 22 Whatever one thinks of the superlative, it is hard to deny the urgency. One study notes that “in the
City of Chicago . . . the homicide rate has averaged from sixteen
to eighteen per one hundred thousand people in recent years—
about three times the national average.” 23 Notably, “almost all
17 Joseph Blocher, Opinion, American Cities Have Always Regulated Guns. Now,
Most Can’t., WASH. POST (Mar. 25, 2021), https://perma.cc/NY3W-TZET.
18 Zusha Elinson, Colorado Lets Cities Set Their Own Gun Laws, and Boulder Plans to
Move Quickly, WALL ST. J. (June 19, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/colorado-lets-cities
-set-their-own-gun-laws-and-boulder-plans-to-move-quickly-11624121655.
19 No. 20-843 (U.S. filed Dec. 23, 2020).
20 Transcript of Oral Argument at 78, Bruen, No. 20-843 (U.S. Nov. 3, 2021).
21 Id. at 74 (“[I]t seems completely intuitive to me, and I think to many people, . . .
that there should be different gun regimes in New York City than in rural counties upstate.”).
22 OFF. OF THE MAYOR & CHI. POLICE DEP’T, CITY OF CHI., TRACING THE GUNS: THE
IMPACT OF ILLEGAL GUNS ON VIOLENCE IN CHICAGO 1 (2014), https://perma.cc/CT6J-VCFC
(“In 2012 the Chicago Police Department confiscated 7,624 guns, which is more gun recoveries per capita than LA and NYC combined.”).
23 Philip J. Cook, Richard J. Harris, Jens Ludwig & Harold A. Pollack, Some Sources
of Crime Guns in Chicago: Dirty Dealers, Straw Purchasers, and Traffickers, 104 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717, 719 (2015).
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murders in Chicago are committed by gun. The percentage in recent years has been in the 80%–85% range, far above the national
average of about 68%.” 24 And even those citywide statistics do not
tell the full story because there are important geographic differences within the city 25 and the costs of gun misuse go beyond
those who are actually hit with bullets. 26
Chicago’s efforts to staunch the bleeding with regulation have
run into some constitutional hurdles, giving the city a prominent
role in the recent wave of Second Amendment litigation. While
Heller is deservedly credited (or blamed) for imbuing the right to
keep and bear arms with new meaning, the practical scope of that
holding expanded significantly when McDonald v. City of Chicago 27
made it applicable to state and local governments. 28 Chicago’s gun
laws have been repeatedly challenged—sometimes successfully—
in McDonald and after. 29 A native son of Chicago, Justice John
Paul Stevens—who dissented in both Heller and McDonald—was
the most prominent and powerful judicial critic of these doctrinal
developments, calling for Heller to be overturned and the Second
Amendment to be repealed. 30 Chicago, in short, has been a central
player in the modern Second Amendment debate. In fact, although

Id. at 731.
See id. at 719 (noting that Chicago’s citywide homicide rate “masks large and persistent geographic differences”); JOCELYN FONTAINE, NANCY LA VIGNE, DAVID LEITSON,
NKECHI ERONDU, CAMERON OKEKE & ANAMIKA DWIVEDI, URB. INST., “WE CARRY GUNS TO
STAY SAFE” 1 (2018) (noting that Chicago’s homicides and shootings “are concentrated on
the West and South Sides”); Sarah Nagy, Who’s in the Sights: Fighting the Illegal Effects
of Legal Gun Ownership in Chicago, 21 PUB. INT. L. REP. 35, 37 (2015) (“[T]he rate of legal
gun ownership per capita is highest not in the highest-crime areas, but in the lowest-crime
areas.” (citing Devin Hughes & Evan Defilippis, Data Shows Highest Rates of Illinois Concealed Carry Permits in Low-Crime Zip Codes—Not More Dangerous Chicago Neighborhoods, THE TRACE (July 10, 2015), https://perma.cc/CRF8-8SKY)).
26 Marika Iszczyszyn, Responding to Chicago’s Invisible Gun Violence Victims, 25
ANNALS HEALTH L. ADVANCE DIRECTIVE 124, 126 (2016) (“In poor, high-crime neighborhoods, such as Chicago’s South and West Sides, gun violence is prevalent and affects children on the sidelines in the devastating form of PTSD.”). For an argument that prevention
of these harms—and not just wrongful shootings—is also an important regulatory interest, see Joseph Blocher & Reva B. Siegel, When Guns Threaten the Public Sphere: A New
Account of Public Safety Regulation Under Heller, 116 NW. U. L. REV. 139, 160–63 (2021).
27 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
28 Id. at 750.
29 See, e.g., Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 690 (7th Cir. 2011); Ezell v. City
of Chicago, 846 F.3d. 888, 890 (7th Cir. 2017).
30 See, e.g., John Paul Stevens, The Supreme Court’s Worst Decision of My Tenure,
THE ATLANTIC (May 14, 2019), https://perma.cc/JD6U-334A; John Paul Stevens, Opinion,
Repeal the Second Amendment, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2018), https://perma.cc/PLE5-BFHV.
Justice Stevens probably wrote more about the Second Amendment than any other member of the Court ever has. See Joseph Blocher & Darrell A.H. Miller, Stevens, J., Dissenting: The Legacy of Heller, 109 JUDICATURE, Fall 2019, https://perma.cc/PF34-5RQC.
24
25
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it is not a party to Bruen, Chicago was a topic of discussion at oral
argument. Paul Clement, representing the challengers, pointed
to Chicago as a jurisdiction that has taken significant steps to
regulate guns despite not having a restriction like the New York
law being challenged. 31 Justice Kagan responded, “I mean, most
people think that Chicago is, like, the [ ] the world’s worst city with
respect to gun violence, Mr. Clement.” 32 She quickly added, “Chicago doesn’t think that, but everybody else thinks it about Chicago.” 33
But in terms of the legal impact on gun regulation in the
United States, the more significant story unfolded decades earlier
in Chicago’s suburbs. In June 1981—a year before Chicago passed
the handgun restriction that would eventually be struck down in
McDonald34—the Village of Morton Grove, Illinois, banned the
sale and private possession of handguns within municipal limits, 35 giving residents until February 1982 to dispose of their
guns. 36 The backlash was swift, severe, and nationwide, effectively generating the rise of gun preemption laws.
This Essay begins by telling the story of the first wave of
preemption laws 37 and then turns to the current and more punitive preemption movement. 38 The second Part of the Essay then
provides some brief thoughts on how to evaluate the distribution
of gun regulation authority between states and cities. 39
I. MORTON GROVE AND THE SPREAD OF PREEMPTION LAWS
State preemption of local regulation has been the subject of
substantial scholarly conversation in recent years. 40 But, traditionally, firearms-law scholars have not paid as much attention
to preemption as they have to the Second Amendment. 41 This is a
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 20, at 36.
Id.
33 Id.
34 See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 750–51.
35 Professor Kristin Goss provides the most detailed account that I have found of the
Morton Grove ordinance and the response to it. See Kristin A. Goss, Policy, Politics, and
Paradox: The Institutional Origins of the Great American Gun War, 73 FORDHAM L. REV.
681, 703–08 (2004).
36 Andrew Kirby, Law and Disorder: Morton Grove and the Community Control of
Handguns, 11 URB. GEOGRAPHY 474, 477 (1990).
37 See infra Part I.A.
38 See infra Part I.B.
39 See infra Part II.
40 See, e.g., infra notes 80–86 and accompanying text.
41 This is simply a comparative claim; there are of course interesting and important
counterexamples. See, e.g., David Fagundes & Darrell A.H. Miller, The City’s Second
31
32
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missed opportunity, both because firearms-preemption laws were
among the vanguard in the larger preemption movement 42 and
because they pose major obstacles to local gun control in many
states. 43 Such laws arose in two main waves.
A. The First Wave
It is not an overstatement to say that Morton Grove’s handgun ban did for preemption what D.C.’s did for the Second
Amendment. As one scholar put it, after the preemption movement
had gained steam, “‘Morton Grove’ ha[d] become a metaphor for
the right of the jurisdiction to pass such ordinances, and a codeword for those who resist gun control, such as the members of the
National Rifle Association.” 44 In 1986, a National Rifle Association
(NRA) brief noted that further enactment of preemption laws “remains the top legislative priority,” 45 and an NRA spokesman said
that “the debate has shifted from national to State levels where
hard-fought campaigns . . . are being waged.” 46
The NRA won nearly all these campaigns. As Professor
Richard Schragger notes of preemption laws, “The firearms industry has been particularly successful in large part because the
National Rifle Association has acted aggressively at the state
level.” 47 Morton Grove’s prohibition provided an especially powerful opportunity for the NRA to deploy what has traditionally been
one of its most effective arguments—that gun rights advocates
must act quickly and decisively to prevent full-scale gun

Amendment, 106 CORNELL L. REV. 677, 728–43 (2021); Simon, supra note 14. Rachel Simon’s
article in particular provides a deep and thorough analysis of preemption laws.
42 Emily Badger, Blue Cities Want to Make Their Own Rules. Red States Won’t Let
Them., N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2017), https://perma.cc/U83W-SWX9 (tracing current preemption laws involving a broad range of subject matters to the tobacco and firearm laws of the
1980s and 1990s).
43 See Richie Feder & Lewis Rosman, State Preemption of Local Government: The
Philadelphia Story, 49 ENV’T L. REP. 10772, 10775 (2019) (“The single most dramatic and
significant preemption—from Philadelphia’s perspective—is the General Assembly’s
preemption of almost any regulation of the ownership, possession or transfer of firearms.”);
see also Firearms Owners Against Crime v. Lower Merion Township, 151 A.3d 1172, 1179–
80 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2016) (concluding that the township lacked the power to prohibit guns
on property owned by the township, such as public parks).
44 Kirby, supra note 36, at 475.
45 Darwin Farrar, In Defense of Home Rule: California’s Preemption of Local Firearms Regulation, 7 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 51, 53–54 (1996) (quoting NAT’L RIFLE ASSOC.
OF AM. INST. FOR LEGIS. ACTION, NRA-ILA STATE LEGISLATIVE ISSUE BRIEF (1986)).
46 Kirby, supra note 36, at 479 (quoting Ted Lattanzio, Florida Gun Owners and
Lawmen Stand Together, AM. RIFLEMAN, May 1987, at 42, 42–43).
47 Schragger, supra note 1, at 1170.
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prohibition. 48 As a spokesman put it, “We are focusing our attention on Morton Grove . . . because their actions exemplify what we
believe is the first step toward banning all gun possession.”49
(Such bans never materialized, even in states with no preemption
laws.)
These preemption laws varied in how much legal regulation
they prevented: some forbade all regulation (at least nominally),
others did the same but with enumerated exceptions, and yet others prohibited only specific types of regulation. 50 State preemption
laws eventually targeted more than specific regulations like those
enacted in Morton Grove. In the late 1990s, a series of municipal
lawsuits threatened to do to the gun industry what other mass
tort claims had done to the tobacco industry. 51 Between 1998 and
2000, twenty-nine cities—including Chicago—sued the gun industry. 52 Chicago and others adopted a public-nuisance theory,
alleging that the industry’s actions “created ‘an unreasonable
jeopardy to the public’s health, welfare and safety’ and ‘a disturbance and reasonable apprehension of danger to person and property.’” 53
This municipal litigation represented an existential threat to
the gun industry, and some states passed laws explicitly
preempting it. 54 These state laws were soon backed up by the
federal Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act 55 (PLCAA),
which made it impossible to assert liability against gun sellers
48 See OSHA GRAY DAVIDSON, UNDER FIRE: THE NRA AND THE BATTLE FOR GUN
CONTROL 149 (Univ. of Iowa Press expanded ed. 1998) (1993) (calling this the “Armageddon
Appeal”). For a general account of constitutional rhetoric in the gun debate, see generally
Joseph Blocher, Gun Rights Talk, 94 B.U. L. REV. 813 (2014).
49 Goss, supra note 35, at 704–05 (alteration omitted) (quoting Nathaniel Sheppard
Jr., Illinois Town Faces Lawsuit After Limiting Pistol Use, N.Y. TIMES (July 4, 1981),
https://perma.cc/84T8-KFP4).
50 For a helpful and detailed overview, see Simon, supra note 14, at 24–27.
51 For commentary on this litigation movement, see Philip J. Cook, Jens Ludwig &
Adam M. Samaha, Gun Control After Heller: Threats and Sideshows from a Social Welfare
Perspective, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1041, 1055–56 (2009). See generally SUING THE GUN
INDUSTRY: A BATTLE AT THE CROSSROADS OF GUN CONTROL AND MASS TORTS (Timothy D.
Lytton ed., 2005).
52 See Note, Recovering the Costs of Public Nuisance Abatement: The Public and Private City Sue the Gun Industry, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1521 (2000).
53 Id. (quoting First Amended Complaint at 67, Chicago v. Beretta, No. 98-CH-15596
(Cir. Ct. Cook Cnty. filed Apr. 7, 1999)).
54 Sarah L. Swan, Preempting Plaintiff Cities, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1241, 1253
(2018) (“Express preemption was a frequent occurrence in the gun litigation context,
where states passed legislation that explicitly preempted city litigation.”); Note, supra
note 52, at 1523 (noting that, “[a]s of March 2000, only one public nuisance claim had
survived a motion to dismiss”).
55 Pub. L. No. 109-92, 119 Stat. 2095 (2005) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901–7903).
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and manufacturers, even in pending cases, 56 with limited exceptions for things like design defects or negligent entrustment. 57 Professor Sarah Swan explains that “the initial state preemption
laws, along with the federal Protection of Lawful Commerce in
Arms Act, effectively ended municipal gun litigation.” 58
Despite these substantial obstacles, some municipal and private plaintiffs are still trying new legal theories, albeit with limited success. 59 Swan notes, for example, that the municipal lawsuit in City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corp. 60 survived an initial
preemption challenge. 61 The city of Gary, Indiana, asserted claims
of public nuisance, negligent distribution of guns, and negligent
design—claims that the Indiana Court of Appeals found were not
a form of regulation but rather an exercise of the expressly authorized power of cities to seek relief against public nuisances.62
The success was short-lived, because the state legislature responded by further tightening its preemption law. 63 But as of this
writing, the Indiana courts have held that the suit is not
preempted, and it is scheduled to proceed to trial. 64
This has not prevented somewhat similar litigation in and
around Chicago. In 2014, a group called the Coalition for Safe
Chicago Communities sued three municipalities where the sellers
of many of Chicago’s crime guns are located, alleging, inter alia,
that their failure to regulate gun dealers violated state civil rights
law. 65 (In Chicago, as in other places, a disproportionate number of

15 U.S.C. § 7902.
15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(i)–(vi) (listing exceptions).
58 Swan, supra note 54, at 1255–56.
59 Sayre Weaver, Strategic Uses of Local Regulation in Firearms Litigation, in 2
ASSOCIATION OF TRIAL LAWYERS OF AMERICAN ANNUAL CONVENTION REFERENCE
MATERIALS 2161 (2001) (“[M]unicipal codes often declare that certain activities and repeated violations of certain code provisions constitute public nuisances per se. With an
appropriate set of facts, such a code provision might enable a plaintiff to allege a statutory
basis for a public nuisance claim against a gun industry defendant.”).
60 801 N.E.2d 1222 (Ind. 2003).
61 Swan, supra note 54, at 1255.
62 Gary, 801 N.E.2d at 1227. Similarly, when Smith & Wesson argued that Boston’s
lawsuit against it was an effort to “regulate through litigation,” the trial judge responded,
“Defendants’ argument fails because this is a tort and contract case, not a suit about a
local by-law or ordinance.” City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 199902590, 2000
WL 1473568, at *11 (Mass. Sup. Ct. July 13, 2000).
63 Swan, supra note 54, at 1255.
64 See Dru Stevenson, New Decision in a (Very) Old Case: City of Gary v. Smith &
Wesson Corp, DUKE CTR. FOR FIREARMS L.: SECOND THOUGHTS BLOG (Dec. 13, 2019),
https://perma.cc/7EY4-7M8G.
65 See Complaint at 8–11, Coal. for Safe Chi. Cmtys. v. Village of Riverdale (Ill. Cir.
Ct. Cook Cnty. July 7, 2015) (No. 2015-CH-10390).
56
57
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crime guns can be traced to a handful of sellers.)66 A year later, that
lawsuit was dismissed.67 But, again, a similar lawsuit is ongoing.68
The most notable exception to this trend of dismissals has
been Soto v. Bushmaster Firearms International, 69 often referred
to as the Sandy Hook lawsuit. 70 Soto does not involve a municipal
plaintiff but does involve claims roughly akin to those that cities
had earlier pursued, sparking the statutory response. 71 Families
of those killed in that massacre sued companies whose AR-15style rifle had been used in the murders, alleging, among other
claims, that the companies violated Connecticut’s unfair trade
practices law when they “knowingly marketed, advertised, and
promoted the XM15-E2S for civilians to use to carry out offensive,
military style combat missions against their perceived enemies.” 72
(The ad reading “Consider your man card reissued” has been
widely noted.) 73 The Connecticut Supreme Court ruled that the
unfair trade practices claim was not barred by the PLCAA, 74 and
the U.S. Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of certiorari,
so the case is currently scheduled for trial in state court. 75
Whether such suits are a proper vehicle for addressing the
harms of gun violence is beyond the scope of this Essay. 76 For present purposes, the point is simply that firearms preemption laws
spread quickly in the wake of Morton Grove. “In 1979, two states
. . . had full preemption, and five states had partial preemption.”77
66 Nagy, supra note 25 at 40 (citing OFF. OF THE MAYOR & CHI. POLICE DEP’T, supra
note 22, at 5) (“Close to twenty percent of guns—that is, one out of every five guns recovered from Chicago crime scenes in 2014—came from only four stores, three of them located
right on the borders of Chicago’s city limits.”).
67 Jonathan Bilyk, Cook County Judge Tosses Lawsuit Brought by Pfleger, Other Activists vs Suburbs over Gun Shop Regulation, COOK CNTY. REC. (Mar. 2, 2016),
https://perma.cc/9PCB-KLBA.
68 See Dru Stevenson, New Case: Powell v. State of Illinois, DUKE CTR. FOR FIREARMS
L.: SECOND THOUGHTS BLOG (Oct. 14, 2019), https://perma.cc/2Y6K-4KSY.
69 202 A.3d 262 (Conn. 2019), cert. denied sub nom. Remington Arms Co. v. Soto, 140
S. Ct. 513 (2019).
70 As this Essay was in production, Mexico filed suit against U.S. firearms manufacturers, asserting an exception to PLCAA. Michael C. Dorf, Mexican Government Lawsuit
Against U.S. Gun Makers Tests the Limits of Territoriality, VERDICT (Sept. 1, 2021),
https://perma.cc/Z76B-DVEH.
71 Cf. Swan, supra note 54, at 1255–56 (discussing earlier municipal litigation and
states’ statutory response).
72 Soto, 202 A.3d at 272.
73 Bill Chappell, Supreme Court Allows Sandy Hook Families’ Case Against Remington
Arms to Proceed, NPR (Nov. 12, 2019), https://perma.cc/N379-QYLQ.
74 Soto, 202 A.3d at 272–73.
75 Chappell, supra note 73.
76 For a recent article about municipal litigation more broadly, see generally Eli Savit,
States Empowering Plaintiff Cities, 52 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 581 (2019).
77 Goss, supra note 35, at 706.
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By 1989, eighteen states had full preemption, and three had partial preemption. 78 Today, all but a handful preempt local gun regulation. 79 This is a legal transformation on par with Heller itself.
B. The Second Wave
The past decade “has witnessed the emergence and rapid
spread of a new and aggressive form of state preemption of local
government action.” 80 Many of these new preemption laws—
sometimes called “hyper preemption,” “preeemption plus,” or the
“new preemption”—“include lawmakers’ efforts to tack on direct
threats, fines, loss of funds, and broad deauthorizations of powers
to traditional preemption clauses or provisions.” 81 Professor Erin
Scharff writes that this kind of preemption “seeks not just to curtail local government policy authority over a specific subject, but
to broadly discourage local governments from exercising policy
authority in the first place.” 82 Local leaders are not likely to test
the limits if they face possible fines, defunding, criminal liability,
or removal from office as a result. 83 As Professor Nestor Davidson
explains, “[S]tate oversight is turning punitive. . . . To call this a
sea change in state-local relations would be an understatement.”84
This second wave of preemption laws has an unmistakably
partisan cast, 85 as “the preponderance of new preemption actions
and proposals have been advanced by Republican-dominated
state governments, embrace conservative economic and social
causes, and respond to—and are designed to block—relatively

78

Id.
Nestor M. Davidson, The Dilemma of Localism in an Era of Polarization, 128 YALE
L.J. 954, 967 (2019) (counting at least forty-four states); Kopel, supra note 10, at 123
(counting forty-six); Joseph Tartakovsky, Firearm Preemption Laws and What They Mean
for Cities, 54 MUN. LAW., Sept./Oct. 2013, at 6, 7 (counting forty-five).
80 Richard Briffault, The Challenge of the New Preemption, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1995,
1997 (2018).
81 James G. Hodge, Jr., Danielle Chronister, Alexandra Hess, Madeline Morcelle,
Jennifer Piatt & Sarah A. Wetter, Public Health Preemption+: Constitutional Affronts to
Public Health Innovations, 79 OHIO ST. L.J. 685, 687 (2018); see also Lauren E. Phillips,
Note, Impeding Innovation: State Preemption of Progressive Local Regulations, 117
COLUM. L. REV. 2225, 2250–53 (2017) (noting that such laws hold local officials personally
liable or make it hard for local governments to contest preemption).
82 Erin Adele Scharff, Hyper Preemption: A Reordering of the State-Local Relationship?,
106 GEO. L.J. 1469, 1473 (2018).
83 Swan, supra note 54, at 1257 (“When the consequences of overstepping the
preemption line are so severe, cities are unlikely to test where it lies.”).
84 Davidson, supra note 79, at 958.
85 Phillips, supra note 81, at 2277; Joel Rogers, Foreword: Federalism Bound, 10
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 281, 297 (2016).
79
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progressive local regulations.” 86 As part of that broader transformation, many firearms preemption laws have become far stricter
and more punitive.
Even measured against the baseline of Morton Grove–era
laws, the second wave of firearms preemption is striking. Florida
provides a prominent, if somewhat extreme, example. Although
the state has adopted some new gun regulations in the wake of
the Parkland massacre—including a “red flag” law that has been
used more often than any other state’s 87—it also has an unusually
stringent preemption law. Local officials found in violation of the
preemption law can be fined up to $5,000 and face damages of up
to $100,000, 88 and initially faced the prospect of removal from office by the governor. 89 A state trial court later declared the removal provision unconstitutional—at least as applied to county
commissioners, who can be removed only by the state senate 90—
and the reach of other provisions is still being tested. When the
state law was passed, Tallahassee, Florida, had various gun laws
on the books, which were preempted by the state law but that the
city was not enforcing. 91 A gun rights organization nonetheless
sued, arguing that the preemption law’s prohibition on “promulgation” of firearms regulations required the city to repeal existing
ordinances. 92 The Florida Court of Appeals rejected this statutory
claim and did not reach the city’s counterargument that the
preemption statute violated the state constitution. 93 The litigation continues to this day. 94
Scharff highlights the experience of Tucson, Arizona, which
adopted a policy of destroying handguns “acquired as crime evidence if those weapons failed to serve a law enforcement purpose

Briffault, supra note 80, at 1997–98.
Terry Spencer, Florida ‘Red Flag’ Gun Law Used 3,500 Times Since Parkland, AP
NEWS (Feb. 14, 2020), https://perma.cc/6VVR-S9PL.
88 FLA. STAT. § 790.33(3)(c), (f) (2017). Additionally, local governments cannot use
public funds to defend such suits. FLA. STAT. § 790.33(3)(d) (2017); see also MISS. CODE
ANN. § 45-9-53(5)(c) (2015) (providing for civil liability and similarly prohibiting the use
of public funds to defend). Lauren Phillips notes that Kentucky’s preemption law goes even
further by making it a misdemeanor to pass any gun regulation, thus “criminalizing the
passage of local regulations.” Phillips, supra note 81, at 2251 (emphasis in original) (citing
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 65.870 (West 2012)).
89 FLA. STAT. § 790.33(3)(e) (2017), invalidated by Marcus v. Scott, No. 2012-CA-1260,
2014 WL 3797314 (Fla. Cir. Ct. June 2, 2014).
90 Marcus, 2014 WL 3797314, at *3–4.
91 Fla. Carry, Inc. v. City of Tallahassee, 212 So. 3d 452, 456 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017).
92 Id. at 464.
93 Id. at 464–66.
94 For a summary, see Simon, supra note 14, at 56–57.
86
87
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and could not be repurposed for police work.” 95 The state attorney
general determined that Tucson’s crime-gun-destruction policy
“may violate” state law, a determination that the city has challenged in court—unsuccessfully, thus far. 96 Under Arizona’s extraordinary (and apparently unique) preemption law, Tucson
faces the loss of roughly a quarter of its general revenues. 97
These preemption laws have an incredibly broad reach—far
greater than the Second Amendment itself. Indeed, the statutes
are drafted such that it is almost hard to imagine courts applying
them literally. As former deputy solicitor general of Nevada Joseph
Tartakovsky notes, “To say that a town can’t pass laws ‘relating
to’ firearms (as so many municipal ordinances do, directly or incidentally) is to affect a staggeringly broad sweep of regulation.” 98 Even the most strident advocates of preemption laws or
the right to keep and bear arms “would probably agree that a
city jail can ban people from entering with weapons or that a
board of supervisors can forbid the recreational discharge of guns
at 3 a.m. in residential neighborhoods.” 99
Still, there is good reason to suppose that other local ordinances will either be successfully challenged or never passed in
the first place as municipal leaders bow to the deterrent effect. 100
The normative question, which the next Part begins to address,
is whether this is a desirable state of affairs.
II. WHICH LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT SHOULD REGULATE GUNS
AND IN WHICH WAYS?
The current wave of preemption laws has been the subject of
much scholarly discussion in recent years. 101 And just as Second

Scharff, supra note 82, at 1509 (citing TUCSON, ARIZ., CODE § 2-142 (2005)).
State ex rel. Brnovich v. City of Tucson, 399 P.3d 663, 666 (Ariz. 2017).
97 Scharff, supra note 82, at 1496; see also id. at 1495–97, 1507–10 (describing ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-194.01 (2016), which requires the state attorney general—upon determining that a local regulation is preempted and remains uncured—to direct the state
treasurer to withhold state-shared revenue, which in Tucson’s case represents roughly a
quarter of the city’s general revenue fund).
98 Tartakovsky, supra note 79, at 7.
99 Id. at 8.
100 Simon, supra note 14, at 37–38 (noting that “[o]ther examples from Florida confirm the prediction that punitive preemption would dissuade localities from testing the
viability of new gun laws” and, in some instances, would discourage efforts to open public
dialogue on firearm issues altogether).
101 See generally, e.g., Briffault, supra note 80; Scharff, supra note 82. See also, e.g.,
Kenneth A. Stahl, Preemption, Federalism, and Local Democracy, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
133, 134 (2017). Preemption laws are only one part of a broader realignment of power
between states and cities. Schragger, supra note 1, at 1184. For an earlier treatment of
95
96
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Amendment debate can no longer be characterized as a simple
binary of for or against guns or gun rights, evaluating preemption laws likewise demands a more nuanced normative account.
Davidson highlights “the double-edged sword of localism: local
empowerment can be used for desirable as well as pernicious
ends.” 102 He suggests that, “[w]hile there is no simple way to resolve the dilemma, normative considerations undergirding the
vertical allocation of power in the states should be more directly
confronted, allowing evaluation of the valence of local power in
light of the normative commitments states have made.” 103
Those normative considerations are unlikely to be transsubstantive. State preemption of speed limits, antidiscrimination
rules, and gun regulations all raise different considerations of doctrine, history, politics, and policy. 104 Even within a single category,
the answers will vary depending on what kind of regulation is at
issue. Prohibitions on classes of weapons, for example, may be of
limited utility where the regulating entity shares a porous border
with a deregulated jurisdiction. 105 Chicago’s experience certainly
suggests as much. 106 But other kinds of regulations can be implemented reasonably effectively at the local level. Permit requirements for public carrying, for example, can be enforced on the spot
regardless of what neighboring jurisdictions choose to do. Given
that the particular costs and benefits of public carrying are quite
different in urban and rural areas, there could be social-welfare
reasons for preferring such localized enforcement.
What follows, then, is a limited and provisional canvassing of
some broad arguments for and against firearms preemption
laws—a framework with which to evaluate them rather than a
similar themes, see generally GERALD FRUG & DAVID J. BARRON, CITY BOUND: HOW
STATES STIFLE URBAN INNOVATION (2008).
102 Davidson, supra note 79, at 958.
103 Id. at 984.
104 Scharff, supra note 82, at 1491–93 (canvassing three general arguments for local
control: providing “a divided populace a better chance of maximizing policy preferences,”
allowing better responses to “problems that are local in nature,” and offering “additional
laboratories of democracy”) (quotation marks omitted). For a general account of the value
of local self-government, see RICHARD SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER: URBAN GOVERNANCE IN
A GLOBAL AGE 18–42 (2016).
105 German Lopez, Almost 74% of Guns Used in New York Crimes Come from States
with Weaker Gun Laws, VOX (Oct. 26, 2016), https://perma.cc/GF4C-W7U5.
106 See OFF. OF THE MAYOR & CHI. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 22, at 5 (noting that
roughly 60% of guns recovered at Chicago crime scenes in 2014 were purchased in states
with weaker gun laws, most of them coming from Indiana); Cook et al., supra note 23, at
725 (“Most gang guns come from central or southern Illinois, or another state (especially
Indiana), even more so than what we see among crime guns found among non-gang
members.”).
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single argument for or against. The overall message is not agnostic, however: in general, preemption laws go too far in denying
local control. While there are strong arguments that some kinds
of gun regulation should indeed be done (if at all) at the state or
even national level, laws like those that prohibit cities from passing any rules relating to firearms unnecessarily hamper local variation and experimentation, restrict the effective implementation
of lifesaving local policies, and threaten constitutional interests
even as they are described as a bulwark to protect them.
A. Variation and Experimentation
One standard argument in favor of firearms preemption laws
has been that, without them, gun owners would face a hodgepodge of local rules. Although people disagree about the scale of
this cost and whether it is offset by benefits, local variation undeniably raises the costs of compliance, 107 increases the burdens of
travel, and exposes some gun owners to legal liability. The NRA
argues that preemption laws are, therefore, “vital as they prevent
localities from enacting an incomprehensible patchwork of local
ordinances. Without these measures unsuspecting gun owners
would be forced to forego the exercise of their Second Amendment
rights or risk running afoul of convoluted and potentially inaccessible local rules.” 108
A version of this argument, having prevailed in many states,
has now moved up to the national level, where the NRA’s recent
legislative priority has been the passage of national concealed
carry reciprocity—federal legislation that would require all states
to accept concealed carry licenses issued by any others. 109 Some
supporters compare this proposal to the interstate acceptance of
driver’s licenses, 110 and while that comparison is inapt for many
107 RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 468 (8th ed. 2016) (noting the cost of compliance argument more
generally).
108 Strong Firearms Preemption Laws Are More Important than Ever, NRA INST. FOR
LEGIS. ACTION (Nov. 11, 2019), https://perma.cc/JM9H-PB8H; see also Gun Bans: Court
Reminds Local Governments They Lack Authority to Restrict Guns, NRA INST. FOR LEGIS.
ACTION (Dec. 23, 2016), https://perma.cc/KW26-QK2K (describing Pennsylvania’s preemption law as “enacted to eliminate the inconsistent and confusing regulatory hodge-podge
that results when each locality adopts its own ‘customized’ regulations on guns”).
109 Dan Friedman, National Concealed-Carry ‘Reciprocity’: The NRA’s Next Big Push
Explained, THE TRACE (Apr. 27, 2017), https://perma.cc/LM4U-44F5.
110 Katie Zezima, Trump Plan Calls for Nationwide Concealed Carry and an End to
Gun Bans, WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2015), https://perma.cc/UC3H-R6CR (“If we can do that
for driving—which is a privilege, not a right—then surely we can do that for concealed
carry, which is a right, not a privilege.” (quoting then-candidate Donald Trump)).
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reasons, 111 the basic intuition is clear enough: law-abiding citizens
should be able to cross jurisdictional lines without fear of accidental lawbreaking. In the words of an NRA op-ed:
[O]therwise law-abiding citizens – including veterans, a single
mother, a disaster response worker, a nurse and medical
school student, and even a corrections officer – have become
accidental criminals and suffered seizure of property, arrest,
detention, and even prosecution because they failed to navigate the legal minefield that is the current state reciprocity
system. 112
Whether those incidents demonstrate a “legal minefield” is
debatable, especially considering the number of concealed carry
license holders in the United States, which the same NRA publication pegs at more than fifteen million. 113 As Professor Kristin
Goss notes, “before Morton Grove, hundreds of cities and towns
had gun control ordinances, many of which were stricter than
state and federal laws. Yet the record contains no evidence that
these established ordinances were of much ongoing concern to the
NRA and its allies.” 114
Even if compliance with differing local laws does impose some
information costs on gun owners, that, in and of itself, is not so
unusual as to justify broad preemption. After all, criminal laws—
and even the contours of federal constitutional rights 115—often
vary across jurisdictions, sometimes within a state. Far from being an exception, firearms laws have traditionally been a prominent example of this variation. 116 Throughout U.S. history, guns
have been regulated differently in different areas—urban and
111 For one thing, driver’s licenses are governed by an interstate compact—an agreement among the states—rather than a federal statute, and, in fact, the compact permits
significant differences with regard to age and the like. It is not entirely clear whether
Congress even has the enumerated authority to pass a national concealed carry law. See
Joseph Blocher, Constitutional Hurdles for Concealed Carry Reciprocity, TAKE CARE BLOG
(Mar. 16, 2017), https://perma.cc/KN73-UDU3. But see Letter from Stephen E. Sachs,
Randy Barnett & William Baude to Trey Gowdy, Richard Hudson & Justin Amash (Mar.
23, 2017), https://perma.cc/88GN-59SM (arguing that such legislation can be justified on
the basis of the Full Faith and Credit Clause).
112 National Concealed Carry Reciprocity Lies and the Lying Liars Who Tell Them,
NRA INST. FOR LEGIS. ACTION (Jan. 13, 2017), https://perma.cc/NP82-QK3Q.
113 Id.
114 Goss, supra note 35, at 705.
115 See Joseph Blocher, Disuniformity of Federal Constitutional Rights, 2020 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1479, 1485; Brandon L. Garrett, Local Evidence in Constitutional Interpretation,
104 CORNELL L. REV. 855, 870 (2019).
116 Justice Sonia Sotomayor raised this point at oral argument in Bruen: “[D]o we
have any other constitutional right whose exercise in history has been as varied as gun
possession and use?” Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 20, at 77.
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rural, 117 South and North, 118 inside and outside the home, 119 and
so on. 120 In one of the first firearms preemption cases, Galvan v.
Superior Court, 121 the California Supreme Court concluded: “That
problems with firearms are likely to require different treatment
in San Francisco County than in Mono County should require no
elaborate citation of authority.” 122 Given Heller’s approval of
“longstanding” forms of gun regulation, 123 this baseline of tradition is presumably entitled to some respect, either for its own sake
or as a proxy for collective wisdom. 124
One obvious reason for the traditional variation is that the
costs and benefits of guns vary by location. 125 In crowded urban
areas, the externalities of gun use (and misuse) are higher. In rural areas, there are more opportunities for traditionally lawful
purposes like recreation and hunting, and police response times
tend to be longer, thus arguably increasing the utility of a gun for
self-defense. These differentials suggest some room for localized
policy solutions. As Darwin Farrar notes, writing about California’s
firearms preemption regime, “[S]tate legislation can be a blunt
instrument of policy; it is best used to address shared problems
that more or less equally impact different regions of the state.”126
As the following Section describes in more detail, there is some
reason to think that local government regulations can lessen
See Blocher, supra note 4, at 114–21.
See Eric M. Ruben & Saul Cornell, Firearm Regionalism and Public Carry: Placing
Southern Antebellum Case Law in Context, 125 YALE L.J.F. 121, 125–27 (2015).
119 See United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 470 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[A]s we move
outside the home, firearm rights have always been more limited, because public safety
interests often outweigh individual interests in self-defense.”); see also Darrell A.H. Miller,
Guns as Smut, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278, 1280 (2009) (arguing that guns in public are
subject to near-plenary regulatory authority).
120 See David B. Kopel & Joseph G.S. Greenlee, The “Sensitive Places” Doctrine: Locational Limits on the Right to Bear Arms, 13 CHARLESTON L. REV. 203, 264–85 (2018)
(discussing the “sensitive places” doctrine under Heller).
121 452 P.2d 930 (Cal. 1969).
122 Id. at 938; see also Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 412 (7th Cir.
2015) (“Another constitutional principle is relevant: the Constitution establishes a federal
republic where local differences are cherished as elements of liberty, rather than eliminated in a search for national uniformity. . . . Within the limits established by the Justices
in Heller and McDonald, federalism and diversity still have a claim.”). This is in some
sense a simple recognition of “effective local self-government[ ] as an important constituent part of our system of government,” particularly when “the nature of [ ] problems varies
from county to county and city to city.” State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116, 1120, 1126
(Utah 1980).
123 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27.
124 See Darrell A.H. Miller, Second Amendment Traditionalism and Desuetude, 14
GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 223, 224–26 (2016).
125 For a helpful account, see Simon, supra note 14, at 9–17.
126 Farrar, supra note 45, at 53.
117
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localized harms without unnecessarily restricting the ability of
rural residents to use guns for traditionally lawful purposes.
But the arguments for local control do not necessarily support
all kinds of variation when it comes to gun rules. It is hard to
make a geographic tailoring argument for prohibitions on gun
possession by particular classes of persons—those convicted of
domestic violence crime, for example. If a person’s prior conviction makes him or her more dangerous to an intimate partner,
that conclusion probably does not depend much on where he or
she lives. The calculus may look very different for bans on particular classes of weapons, however. A high-powered rifle has a different risk profile in an urban area where its rounds might penetrate
walls and hit bystanders than in a rural area where it might be
used to hunt distant game. 127
The following Section will consider in more detail the local
benefits from a policy perspective. But it is also near-obligatory to
cite Justice Louis Brandeis’s argument that federalism permits
states to serve as laboratories for “novel and social economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.” 128 That argument may have even more purchase at the local level, as Professor
Richard Briffault has noted: if “the fifty states are laboratories for
public policy formation, then surely the 3,000 counties and 15,000
municipalities provide logarithmically more opportunities for innovation, experimentation and reform.” 129 Especially in the face
of congressional gridlock, the benefits of laboratories of experimentation seem all the more important when it comes to guns.
B. Localized Harms
Another argument in favor of preemption laws—or at least
against the argument against them 130—is that local enforcement
of gun laws is ineffective. This is in some ways an interesting converse of the hodgepodge argument: whereas the latter stresses
the difficulty that gun owners face in crossing jurisdictional lines,
127 I suggest this simply as an illustration; which kinds of firearms actually have increased power to penetrate walls and the like is a disputed empirical proposition. See E.
Gregory Wallace, “Assault Weapon” Lethality, 88 TENN. L. REV. 1, 43–45 (2020).
128 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
129 Richard Briffault, Home Rule and Local Political Innovation, 22 J.L. & POL. 1, 31
(2006); see also Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1151–
52 (1980).
130 The ineffectiveness argument tends to be emphasized by opponents of localism,
not necessarily by advocates of preemption. The reason for this, I assume, is that advocates
of preemption laws do not want to emphasize the costs of gun misuse, whereas many advocates of gun regulation want state or federal solutions.
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the effectiveness argument emphasizes the ease with which guns
and gun-related harms do. And indeed, it is well established that
crime guns tend to flow out of states with weaker gun laws; Chicago’s experience, as noted above, is typical in that regard. 131
Another related argument in favor of preemption (or
against localism) is that cities are simply bad at policy making.
Former President Donald Trump’s comments about Chicago
are representative:
The city of Chicago. What the hell is going on in Chicago?
There are those who say that Afghanistan is safer than Chicago, okay? What is going on? You know what’s wrong with
Chicago? Weak, ineffective politicians. Democrats that don’t
want to force restrictions and don’t, and by the way, Chicago,
— for those of you that are gonna say, “Guns, guns” — Chicago
has the toughest gun laws in the United States, okay? Just
in case you were thinking about it. 132
Such anti-urbanism is nothing new in U.S. politics; Schragger
notes that “[t]he enduring anti-urban narrative suggests that the
city is badly governed, bad for citizens’ welfare, and bad for the
nation.” 133
It is far beyond the scope of this short Essay to fully evaluate
that narrative. It is undoubtedly true that local rulemaking can
be parochial, exclusionary, or otherwise discriminatory. 134 And it
is also hard to evaluate the effectiveness of any gun regulation,
local or otherwise, given the relative dearth of reliable empirical
data. 135 Yet, even with those limitations, there is reason to believe
that gun restrictions can yield benefits. 136 For example, evidence
See supra notes 105–106 and accompanying text.
Kori Rumore, “Politicians Ran Chicago into the Ground.” When Trump Talks
About Chicago—and the State of Illinois—We Track It., CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 28, 2020) (quoting
Donald Trump, Remarks at a Rally in Pensacola, Fla. (Dec. 8, 2017))
https://perma.cc/Y6RR-236B. See generally id. (collecting former president Trump’s tweets
about Chicago, many of them highlighting the city’s crime problems and criticizing city
governance).
133 Schragger, supra note 1, at 1195.
134 See Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1132–33 (2007);
Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—Foreword: Federalism All the Way
Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 46 (2010).
135 See NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE: A CRITICAL REVIEW 2–10
(2005) (noting the inconclusiveness of many studies and need for more research).
136 Cf. Lynn A. Baker & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Constitutional Home Rule and Judicial
Scrutiny, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1337, 1354 (2009) (“[H]ome rule made concrete, and legally
salient, the notion that many basic police power functions—including the protection of
health, safety, and general welfare—were well within the competence of, and even perhaps
best effectuated by, municipal governments.”).
131
132
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has shown that, due in part to stringent local regulations, guns
are hard to obtain on the underground gun market in Chicago.137
It seems likely that, as is the case in any other area of law, prohibitions can marginally increase the costs of undesirable behavior,
which should at the very least deter it. 138
Moreover, the policy benefits of local regulation are not necessarily limited to those within the adopting jurisdiction: the benefits of experimentation, or simply political proof of concept, can
be more broadly shared. The same may be true of the political
feasibility of local regulations. As one of the Morton Grove trustees said at the time: “We felt gun control would have to be a
grass-roots effort, as with child labor and pollution laws, and
wanted to send a message to other villages and towns that they
could enact such ordinances.” 139 Goss explains: “Like their national counterparts, most state gun control leaders placed limited
faith in the policy effectiveness of local ordinances. But they did
see the political potential, via the snowball effect, of organizing
around local projects.” 140
As the story in Part I suggests, this did not happen. As Goss
notes, “the gun rights forces appeared to take the political potential of the Chicago-area developments far more seriously than
did the gun control side.” 141 Although groups like the National
Coalition to Ban Handguns would eventually help fund the legal
defense of Morton Grove’s law, 142 they lacked local organizational
power and focused their lobbying energy on Congress. Similar
prohibitions were passed in Evanston and Oak Park, Illinois, but
the imagined grassroots movement never took off. 143 Preemption
laws are not just a reflection of that failure, but a cause—by
137 Philip J. Cook, Jens Ludwig, Sudhir Venkatesh & Anthony A. Braga, Underground
Gun Markets, 117 ECON. J. F558, F561–68 (2007).
138 Friedman, 784 F.3d at 412 (“Local crimes are most likely to be committed by local
residents, who are less likely to have access to firearms banned by a local ordinance. . . .
Plaintiffs’ argument proves far too much: it would imply that no jurisdiction other than
the United States as a whole can regulate firearms.”).
139 Nathaniel Sheppard Jr., Illinois Town Faces Lawsuit After Limiting Pistol Use, N.Y.
TIMES (July 4, 1981), https://perma.cc/84T8-KFP4 (quoted in Goss, supra note 35, at 704).
140 Goss, supra note 35, at 707.
141 Id. at 704; see also Kirby, supra note 36, at 478–79 (describing the NRA’s efforts).
142 See generally Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982) (upholding handgun law).
143 A year after the Morton Grove ordinance, San Francisco mayor Dianne Feinstein
proposed a similar ordinance, which was eventually adopted, even in the face of a written
opinion by the California attorney general concluding that it was preempted—a conclusion
soon confirmed by the California courts. Doe v. City & County of San Francisco, 136 Cal.
App. 3d 509, 511 (Ct. App. 1982). See generally Don B. Kates & C.D. Michel, Local Gun
Bans in California: A Futile Exercise, 41 U.S.F. L. REV. 333 (2007).
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limiting policy innovation, they limit policy diffusion. 144 Whether
that is a good or a bad thing likely depends in part on whether
one thinks that local firearms rules are likely to violate constitutional rights or interests—an issue to which the following Section
turns.
C. Rights and Rhetoric
Supporters of firearms preemption laws often argue that
such laws are needed to protect the right to keep and bear arms.
As noted above, the NRA argued that Morton Grove’s regulation
was the harbinger of a broader campaign to make gun possession
illegal. 145 In the words of one supporter, “There are lots of areas
where home rule certainly applies, . . . [b]ut this is not one of
them. Not when it comes to an unalienable, natural, God-given
right for people to protect themselves.” 146 Similar rhetoric has
been deployed in support of national concealed carry reciprocity, 147 notwithstanding the fact that Heller itself indicates that
concealed carrying of firearms is not even covered by the Second
Amendment. 148 Still, it is true that some of the regulations which
have been held to violate the post-Heller Second Amendment are
local and that stringent preemption laws might have kept them

144 See generally Jacob Alderdice, Note, Impeding Local Laboratories: Obstacles to
Urban Policy Diffusion in Local Government Law, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 459 (2013).
Goss quotes the former leader of a national gun control organization: “There’s no question
that the NRA’s effort to pass preemption laws was a serious setback, and there’s no question that whatever the implications in terms of policy, what you do lose at the local level
is the ability to rally people around a local issue.” Goss, supra note 35, at 706–07.
145 See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text; see also Joe Palazzolo, Ashby Jones
& Patrick O’Connor, City Gun Laws Hit Roadblock, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 5, 2013),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324761004578286072929691906 (“At the
time, Morton Grove’s ban was the strictest gun-control law in the country, and was viewed
as the beginning of a nationwide trend.”).
146 Matt Valentine, Disarmed: How Cities Are Losing the Power to Regulate Guns,
THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 6, 2014) (quoting Patricia Stoneking, president of the Kansas State
Rifle Association), https://perma.cc/SDE6-PL72; see also Robert J. Cahall, Note, Local Gun
Control Laws After District of Columbia v. Heller: Silver Bullets or Shooting Blanks? The
Case for Strong State Preemption of Local Gun Control Laws, 7 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
359, 390 n.98 (2010) (arguing that “the utility of preemption lies in its ability to minimize
and avoid violations of the rights protected by the Second Amendment, and not necessarily
to preclude any and all possible variations in the law that could result in disparate
treatment”).
147 See, e.g., House Passes Concealed Carry Reciprocity, NRA INST. FOR LEGIS. ACTION
(Dec. 6, 2017), https://perma.cc/7TVZ-CTKM.
148 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626; see Jonathan Meltzer, Open Carry for All: Heller and Our
Nineteenth-Century Second Amendment, 123 YALE L.J. 1486, 1518–28 (2014) (arguing
that concealed carry is not covered by the Second Amendment but that open carrying is).
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off the books in the first place. Chicago’s handgun ban is, of
course, an obvious example. 149
The fact that such laws have been struck down in court, however, suggests that preemption laws—if justified as a necessary
protection for Heller’s right—are a solution in search of a problem.
Of course, some gun rights advocates believe that courts are underprotecting the right, relegating it to “second-class” status 150 or
even engaging in “massive resistance” to Heller. 151 But even if one
is sympathetic to this view, 152 it is hard to justify the severity of
current punitive preemption laws. Threatening Tucson with a
loss of state funding because it destroys crime guns that cannot
be repurposed for police work 153 is not required by any plausible
reading of the Second Amendment. Perhaps some local laws go
too far in restricting firearms, but—if rights are the justification—
preemption laws err in the other direction. They go far beyond any
plausible reading of the Second Amendment—for example, by prohibiting local rules “relating to” guns. 154
Of course, one might nonetheless argue that this is the proper
balance to be struck: that preemption laws are supererogatory
with regard to constitutional values, in much the same way that,
say, civil rights statutes properly go above and beyond what equal
protection requires. On this view, the use of preemption as a
prophylactic might be justifiable in roughly the same way that
Congress can use its Section 5 power to prohibit state laws that
have not been found to violate the Fourteenth Amendment. (Of
course, even then, such remedies must be “congruent and

See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 791.
See generally Joseph Blocher & Eric Ruben, “Second-Class” Rhetoric, Ideology, and
Doctrinal Change, 110 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2022).
151 See, e.g., Alice Marie Beard, Resistance by Inferior Courts to Supreme Court’s Second
Amendment Decisions, 81 TENN. L. REV. 673, 673 (2014) (citing Editorial, Massive Gun
ST.
J.
(Apr.
12,
2013),
https://www.wsj.com/artiResistance,
WALL
cles/SB10001424127887324600704578402760760473582) (“In the wake of the Supreme
Court’s District of Columbia v. Heller [ ] and McDonald v. Chicago decisions that clarify,
expand, and protect Second Amendment rights, federal and state inferior courts have been
engaging in massive resistance.”).
152 My own review of post-Heller caselaw does not suggest to me any such widespread
treatment. Ruben & Blocher, supra note 15, at 1507–08. See generally Adam M. Samaha
& Roy Germano, Is the Second Amendment a Second-Class Right?, 68 DUKE L.J. ONLINE
57 (2018) (concluding that there are plausible alternative explanations for the data other
than the “second-class” argument); Timothy Zick, The Second Amendment as a Fundamental Right, 46 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 621 (2019) (arguing that the Second Amendment
and the First Amendment received comparable protection during their first decades of
doctrinal development).
153 See supra notes 95–97 and accompanying text.
154 Tartakovsky, supra note 79, at 7.
149
150
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proportional” to an identified constitutional harm, 155 and some
firearms preemption laws plainly are not.)
One problem with this argument is that preempting regulation in the name of one constitutional interest—gun rights—can
threaten other constitutional interests. 156 Although the gun debate is often portrayed as having the Constitution on just one
side—that of gun owners—such a binary is misleading. As in
other areas of constitutional law, 157 there are constitutional interests on many sides of the dispute. Advocates of gun regulation,
like advocates of gun rights, are increasingly asserting constitutional interests of their own which they say are threatened by unrestricted gun possession: the rights to speak, 158 to peaceably assemble, 159 to receive an education, 160 to responsive government,161
to not keep or bear arms, 162 and to safety and life. 163
Preemption laws represent a government intervention on one
side of this political struggle. They are, it should be emphasized,
a thumb on the scale in favor of gun owners in a battle that they
are already, in many ways, winning. The effects, both direct and
indirect, are considerable.
One of the ripple effects of broad preemption laws might be
to dampen the use of local law to establish a duty of care. Chicago’s
handgun prohibition (the one struck down in McDonald) played a
role in the public-nuisance litigation brought against industry defendants by individual and government plaintiffs in the 1990s.
Specifically, “the plaintiffs allege[d] that [the] defendants market
and distribute their handguns to circumvent these local prohibitions, facilitating, and encouraging sales to Chicago residents as
See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 508 (1997).
Blocher & Siegel, supra note 26, at 33–34.
157 Jamal Greene, The Supreme Court, 2017 Term—Foreword: Rights as Trumps?,
132 HARV. L. REV. 28, 34 (2018) (“The paradigmatic rights conflict of the twenty-first century has involved multiple principles that must be jointly maximized or else selectively
abandoned. . . . Our rights culture cannot constitute us unless all rights count, and all
rights cannot count if all rights are absolute.”).
158 See Gregory P. Magarian, Speaking Truth to Firepower: How the First Amendment
Destabilizes the Second, 91 TEX. L. REV. 49, 55 (2012).
159 See Luke Morgan, Note, Leave Your Guns at Home: The Constitutionality of a Prohibition on Carrying Firearms at Political Demonstrations, 68 DUKE L.J. 175, 185–87 (2018).
160 See Patricia Somers & Nicholas Phelps, Not Chilly Enough? Texas Campus Carry
and Academic Freedom, 9 J. ACAD. FREEDOM 1, 6–8 (2018).
161 See Blocher & Siegel, supra note 26, at 21–25.
162 See Blocher, supra note 11, at 18.
163 See Brief for March for Our Lives Action Fund as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, at 29, N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 139 S. Ct. 939 (2019)
(No. 18-280); see also Jonathan Lowy & Kelly Sampson, The Right Not to Be Shot: Public
Safety, Private Guns, and the Constellation of Constitutional Liberties, 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 187, 196 (2016).
155
156
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well as other prohibited purchasers.” 164 Without such local laws
to turn to, the standard of reasonableness is likely to continue
shifting. Likewise, the limitations on local laws may shift courts’
understanding of what kinds of gun regulations are outliers from
a constitutional perspective. 165
In practice, such laws deny cities the ability to protect themselves 166—the very deficiency that gun owners allege in the context of gun regulation. In that sense, preemption laws represent
what Schragger has called “selective localism”—states’ tendency
to intervene in local affairs when doing so is politically expedient
but without taking responsibility for underlying problems. 167
CONCLUSION
In the legal and political debates over guns, the Second
Amendment tends to claim center stage. But as a practical matter,
state-level preemption laws represent a more significant—and
much more recent—legal obstacle to gun regulation. These laws
also raise deep questions about how to allocate firearm regulatory
authority among federal, state, and local governments. Those
questions do not lend themselves to simple answers, which is precisely why rigid preemption laws should be modified or repealed.

164 Weaver, supra note 59, at 4 (first citing Ceriale v. Smith & Wesson Corp.,
No. 99L5628 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cnty. filed 1999); and then citing City of Chicago v. Beretta
U.S.A. Corp., No. 98CH15596 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cnty. filed 1998)).
165 Kopel, supra note 10, at 123.
166 Fagundes & Miller, supra note 41, at 698; Stephen P. Teret, Susan DeFrancesco
& Linda A. Bailey, Gun Deaths and Home Rule: A Case for Local Regulation of a Local
Public Health Problem, 9 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED., no. 3, 1993, at 44, 45 (“The urban
handgun problem presents a classic situation in which a municipality must be free to exercise its police power to enact its own solution.”).
167 Richard C. Schragger, The Political Economy of City Power, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
91, 102–03 (2017).

